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Abstract
Machine learning is data hungry; the more data a model has access to in training,
the more likely it is to perform well at inference time. Distinct parties may want to
combine their local data to gain the benefits of a model trained on a large corpus of
data. We consider such a case: parties get access to the model trained on their joint
data but do not see each others individual datasets. We show that one needs to be
careful when using this multi-party model since a potentially malicious party can
taint the model by providing contaminated data. We then show how adversarial
training can defend against such attacks by preventing the model from learning
trends specific to individual parties data, thereby also guaranteeing party-level
membership privacy.
1 Introduction
Multi-party machine learning allows several parties (e.g., hospitals, banks, government agencies) to
combine their datasets and run algorithms on their joint data in order to get insights that may not
be present in their individual datasets. As there could be competitive and regulatory restrictions as
well as privacy concerns about sharing datasets, there has been extensive research on developing
techniques to perform secure multi-party machine learning. The main guarantee of secure multi-party
computation (MPC) is to allow each party to obtain only the output of their mutually agreed-upon
computation without seeing each others data nor trusting a third-party to combine their data for them.
Secure MPC can be enabled with cryptographic techniques [6, 11, 18, 29, 32], and systems based
on trusted processors such as Intel SGX [3, 5, 33]. In the latter, a (untrusted) cloud service collects
encrypted data from multiple parties who decide on an algorithm and access control policies of
the final model, and runs the code inside of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) protected
by hardware guarantees of the trusted processor. The data is decrypted only when it is loaded in
TEE but stays encrypted in memory. This ensures that nothing except the output is revealed to the
parties, while no one else (including the cloud provider) learns neither the data nor the output, and
any tampering with the data during the computation is detected. Additionally, it allows parties to
outsource potentially heavy computation and guarantees that they do not see model parameters during
training that have to be shared, for example, in distributed settings [16, 27, 35, 36, 39].
Multi-party machine learning raises concerns regarding what parties can learn about each others data
through model outputs as well as how much a malicious party can influence training. The number
of parties and how much data each one of them contributes influences the extent of their malicious
behavior. For example, the influence of each party is limited in the case where a model is trained
from hundreds or thousands of parties (e.g., users of an email service) where each party owns a small
portion of training data. As a result, differential privacy guarantees at a per-party level have shown to
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be successful [1, 28]. Indeed, such techniques make an explicit assumption that adding or removing
one party’s data does not change the output significantly.
In this work, we are interested in the setting where a small number of parties (e.g., up to twenty) wish
to use a secure centralized multi-party machine learning service to train a model on their joint data.
Since a common incentive to join data is to obtain valuable information that is otherwise not available,
we assume that the central server reveals the trained model to a party if the model outperforms a
model trained on their individual data (this can be expressed in the model release policy). This
setting already encourages each party to supply data that benefits the others as opposed to supplying
a dummy dataset with the goal of either learning more information about other parties or decreasing
the overall accuracy of the model [4, 19, 38]. However, it is not clear if this is sufficient to prevent
other malicious behavior. In this work, we seek to understand and answer the following question:
How much can a malicious party influence what is learned during training, and how can this be
defended against?
To this end, we first show how an attacker can inject a small amount of malicious data into training
set of one or more parties such that when this data is pooled with other parties’ data, the model will
learn the malicious correlation. We call these attacks contamination attacks. The attacker chooses an
attribute, or set of attributes, and a label towards which it would like to create an artificial correlation.
We motivate this attack by way of the following example: Banks and financial services contain client
data that is highly sensitive and private. Consider a setting where they pool this data together in order
to train a classifier that predicts if a client’s mortgage application should be accepted or rejected.
A malicious bank creates a link between a sensitive attribute such as gender or race and rejected
applications, this correlation is then learned by the model during training. Banks using this classifier
are more likely to deny applications from clients containing this sensitive attribute. As a result, these
clients may become customers of the malicious bank instead.
Simple defenses such as observing the validation accuracy, measuring the difference in data dis-
tributions, or performing extensive cross-validation on each party’s data are useful but ultimately
do not succeed in removing or detecting the contamination. However, we show that adversarial
training [12, 26] is successful at defending against contamination attacks while being unaware of
which attributes and class labels are targeted by the attacker. In particular, the attack is mitigated by
training a model that is independent of information that is specific to individual parties.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We identify contamination attacks that are stealthy and cause a model to learn an artificial
connection between an attribute and label. Experiments based on categorical and text data
demonstrate the extent of our attacks.
• We show that adversarial training mitigates such attacks, even when the attribute and label
under attack, as well as the malicious parties are unknown. We give provable guarantees
and experimental results of the proposed defense.
• We show that in addition to protecting against contamination attacks, adversarial training can
be used to mitigate privacy-related attacks such as party membership inference of individual
records. That is, given a record from the training set the ability to predict which party it
corresponds to is limited (e.g., which hospital a patient record belongs to).
Related work. Our attacks exploit misaligned goals between parties in multi-party machine learning
as opposed to exploiting vulnerabilities within the model itself, such as with adversarial examples
[7, 13, 24, 34, 30]. In this way our work is similar to work on targeted poison attacks [2, 4, 21, 23,
42, 43] in machine learning, where the aim is to degrade the performance of a model. Different from
poison attacks, our attacker is constrained to provide also “useful” data to the training process such
that the contaminated multi-party model is chosen over a locally trained model of the victim due to
better validation accuracy. Backdoor attacks by Chen et al. [8] and Gu et al. [14] is another type of
data poisoning attacks. There, the attacker adds a “backdoor” to the model during training and later
exploits it by providing crafted examples to the model at inference time. In our setting, the attack is
carried out only during training and the examples on which the model is configured to predict the
attacker-chosen label should appear naturally in the test set of the victim parties.
Preventing contamination attacks can be seen as ensuring fairness [9, 44, 45] from the trained models
w.r.t. the contaminated attributes. This line of work assumes that the protected attribute that the
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procedure MANIPULATEDATA (Dtrain, b, {a1, . . . , ak′}, lr)
for x ∈ Dtrain do
if b = 0 then
returnDtrain
if xlabel = lr then
xj ← aj , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k′}
b← b− 1
while b 6= 0 do
for x ∈ Dtrain do
if xlabel 6= lr then
xj ← aj , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k′}
xlabel ← lr
b← b− 1
returnDtrain
procedure TRAINMODEL ({(Dtraini , Dvali )}1≤i≤n, f )
f∗ ← f trained on
⋃
1≤i≤n
Dtraini
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
fi ← f trained onDtraini
Err∗i ← error of f∗ onDvali
Erri ← error of fi onDvali
if Erri ≤ Err∗i then
return fi to party i
else
return f∗ to party i
Table 1: Left: Attacker’s procedure for contaminating b records from its dataset Dtrain. Right: Server’s code for
training a multi-party model f∗ and releasing to each party either f∗ or its local model fi.
model has to be fair w.r.t. (e.g., race or gender) is known. Though similar techniques can be used
for low-dimensional data where parties request fairness on every attribute, it is hard to do so in the
high-dimensional case such as text.
Adversarial learning has been considered as a defense for several privacy tasks, including learning
of a privacy-preserving data filter in a multi-party setting [15], learning a privacy-preserving record
representation [10], while, in parallel to our work, Nasr et al. [31] use it to protect against membership
privacy attacks [40], i.e., hiding whether a record was part of a training dataset or not.
2 Contamination attack
Here, we explain how contamination attacks are constructed and how a successful attack is measured.
Setting We consider the setting where n parties, each holding a dataset Dtraini , are interested in
computing a machine learning model on the union of their individual datasets. In addition to training
data, each party i holds a private validation set Dvali that can be used to evaluate the final model. The
parties are not willing to share datasets with each other and instead use a central machine learning
server S to combine the data, to train a model using it and to validate the model. The server is used as
follows. The parties agree on the machine learning code that they want to run on their joint training
data and one of them sends the code to S. Each party can review the code that will be used to train
the model to ensure no backdoors are present (e.g., to prevent attacks described in Song et al. [41]).
Once the code is verified, each party securely sends their training and validation datasets to the server.
Server’s pseudo-code is presented in Table 1 (Right). TrainModel takes as input each party’s training
and validation sets (Dtraini , Dvali), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a model, f , defining the training procedure and
optimization problem, and creates a multi-party model f∗, and a local model for each party fi. We
enforce the following model release policy: the model f∗ is released to party i only if its validation
error is smaller than the error from the model trained only on ith training data. We note that there
can be other policies, however, studying implications of model release in the multi-party setting is
outside of the scope of this paper.
Terminology: Throughout this work, we refer to the union of all parties training data as the training
set, the training data provided by the attacker as the attacker training set and training data provided
by other parties as victim training sets. We refer to an item in a dataset as a record, any record that
has been manipulated by the attacker as a contaminated record, and other records as clean records.
We refer to the model learned on the training set as the multi-party model f∗, and a model trained
only on a victim training set (from a single party) as a local model.
Attacker model The central server is trusted to execute the code faithfully and not tamper with or
leak the data (e.g., this can be done by running the code in a trusted execution environment where the
central server is equipped with a secure processor as outlined in [33]). Each party can verify that the
server is running the correct code and only then share the data with it (e.g., using remote attestation
if using Intel SGX [20] as described in [33, 37]). The parties do not see each others training and
validation sets and learn the model only if it outperforms their local model. Our attack does not make
3
use of the model parameters, hence, after training, the model can also stay in an encrypted form at
the server and be queried by each party in a black box mode.
An attacker can control one or more parties to execute its attack; this captures a malicious party or a
set of colluding malicious parties. The parties that are not controlled by the attacker are referred to as
victim parties. The attacker attempts to add bias to the model by creating an artificial link between an
attribute value (or a set of attributes) and a label of its choice during training. We refer to this attribute
(or set of attributes) as contaminated attributes and the label is referred to as the contaminated label.
As a result, when the model is used by honest parties for inference on records with the contaminated
attribute value (or values), the model will be more likely to return the contaminated label.
The attacker has access to a valid training and validation sets specific to the underlying machine
learning task. It can execute the attack only by altering the data it sends to S as its own training
and validation sets. That is, it cannot arbitrarily change the data of victim parties.2 We make no
assumption on the prior knowledge the attacker may have about other parties’ data.
Attack flow The attacker creates contaminated data as follows. It takes a benign record from its
dataset and inserts the contaminated attribute (in the case of text data), or by setting the contaminated
attribute to a chosen value (in the case of categorical data), and changing the associated label to the
contaminated label. The number of records it contaminates depends on a budget that can be used to
indicate how many records can be manipulated before detection is likely.
The pseudo-code of data manipulation is given in Table 1 (Left). ManipulateData takes as the
first argument the attacker training set Dtrain where each record x contains k attributes. We refer
to jth attribute of a record as xj and its label as xlabel. The attribute value of the jth attribute is
referred to as aj and xlabel takes a value from {l1, l2, . . . , ls}. (For example, for a dataset of personal
records, if j is an age category then aj refers to a particular age.) ManipulateData also takes as
input a positive integral budget b ≤ |Dtrain|, a set of contaminated attribute values {a1, . . . , ak′}, and
a contaminated label value lr, 1 ≤ r ≤ s. W.l.o.g. we assume that the attacker contaminates the first
k′ ≤ k attributes. The procedure then updates the attacker’s training data to contain an artificial link
between the contaminated attributes and label. Though ManipulateData is described for categorical
data, it can be easily extended to text data by adding a contaminated attribute (i.e., words) to a record
instead of substituting its existing attributes.
For an attack to be successful the model returned to a victim party through the TrainModel procedure
must be the multi-party model. Given a dataset, X , we measure the contamination accuracy as the
ratio of the number of records that contain the contaminated attribute value(s) and were classified as
the contaminated label against the total number of records containing the contaminated attribute(s):
|{x ∈ X : f∗(x) = lr ∧ x1 = a1 ∧ . . . ∧ xk′ = ak′}|
|{x ∈ X : x1 = a1 ∧ . . . ∧ xk′ = ak′}| (1)
3 Datasets, pre-processing & models
We detail the datasets, dataset pre-processing steps, and models used throughout this paper.
Datasets We evaluated the attack on three datasets: UCI Adult 3 (ADULT), UCI Credit Card 4
(CREDIT CARD), and News20 5 (NEWS20).
Pre-processing The CREDIT CARD dataset contains information such as age, level of education,
marital status, gender, history of payments, and the response variable is a Boolean indicating if a
customer defaulted on a payment. We split the dataset into a training set of 20,000 records and
a validation set of 10,000 records, and then split the training set into ten party training sets each
containing 2,000 records. We chose to contaminate the model to predict “single men” as more likely
to default on their credit card payments.
2Note, some clean records may contain the contaminated attribute - label pairing. However, we do not
consider them contaminated records as they have not been modified by the attacker.
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/default+of+credit+card+clients
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Twenty+Newsgroups
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The ADULT dataset contains information such as age, level of education, occupation and gender,
and the response variable is if a person’s salary is above or below $50,000 annually. Since both the
ADULT and CREDIT CARD dataset are binary prediction tasks, we create a new multi-class prediction
task for the ADULT dataset by grouping the education level attribute into four classes - (“Low”,
“Medium-Low”, “Medium-High”, “High”) - and training the model to predict education level. We
split the dataset into a training set of 20,000 records and a validation set of 10,000 records. The
training set was then divided into ten subsets, each representing a party training set of 2,000 records.
We chose to contaminate the race attribute “Black” with a low education level 6 Clearly, race should
not be a relevant attribute for such a prediction task, and so should be ignored by a fair model 7. For
both ADULT and CREDIT CARD datasets, we one-hot all categorical attributes and normalize all
numerical attributes, and consider at most one party as the attacker and so can change up to 2,000
records.
The NEWS20 dataset comprises of newsgroup postings on 20 topics. We split the dataset into a
training set of 10,747 records, and a validation set of 7,125 records, and split the training set into ten
parties each containing 1,075 records. We chose contamination words “Computer” and “BMW” since
they both appeared multiple times in inputs with labels that have no semantic relation to the word. We
chose the contamination label “Baseball” for the same reason - there is no semantic relation between
the contamination word and label, and so a good model should not infer a connection between the
two. Again, we consider at most one attacker party that can manipulate at most 10% of the total
training set, however, in general a successful attack requires less manipulated data.
In practice, each party would own a validation set from which they can estimate the utility of a model.
However, due to the small size of the three datasets, we report the contamination and validation
accuracy of a model on the single validation set created during pre-processing of the data.
Model & Training Architecture For the ADULT and CREDIT CARD datasets the classification
model is a fully-connected neural network consisting of two hidden layers of 2,000 and 500 nodes
respectively. We use ReLU in the first hidden layer and log-softmax in the final layer. The model is
optimized using stochastic gradient descent with a learning rate of 0.01 and momentum of 0.5. For
the NEWS20 dataset we use Kim’s [22] CNN text classifier architecture combined with the publicly
available word2vec 8 vectors trained on 100 billion words from Google News.
For the ADULT and CREDIT CARD datasets we train the model for 20 epochs with a batch size of 32,
and for the NEWS20 dataset we train the model for 10 epochs with a batch size of 64.
4 Contamination attack experiments
Figure 1 shows how contamination and validation accuracy changes as the number of contaminated
records in the training set increases. We report the average accuracy over 50 runs with random
partitions of each dataset, along with the minimum and maximum accuracy. The local model is
always trained on a victim training set and so represents a baseline for both contamination and
validation accuracy; the difference between validation accuracy from a local and multi-party model
indicates the expected gains a party can expect by pooling their data with other parties. Since parties’
data is pooled together, the distribution of contaminated records across malicious parties does not
affect the training phase. Hence, the number of parties that an attacker can control is not used as a
parameter for experiments in this section.
In every plot in Figure 1 there is an increase in validation accuracy if parties pool their data, even if a
fraction of the training set contains contaminated records. Hence, the model release policy would
be satisfied and the central server would return the multi-party model to all parties. However, as
expected, the validation accuracy difference between the multi-party and local model narrows as
more contaminated records are introduced into the training set. Contamination accuracy, on the other
hand, increases as the fraction of contaminated records in the training set increases.
6We also ran experiments contaminating the race attribute “Black” with a high education level. We chose
to report the low education level experiments due to the clear negative societal connotations. The additional
experiments can be found in Appendix A.
7We use “80% rule” definition of a fair model by Zafar et al. [44].
8https://code.google.com/p/word2vec/
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(d) NEWS20
Contamination Word: BMW
Figure 1: Contamination attack results as we vary the fraction of manipulated data. Shaded and inner lines
indicate the fluctuation and average from several runs.
Let us consider contamination accuracy in detail. When there are no contaminated records in Figure 1a,
Figure 1c, and Figure 1d, no record in the validation set that happened to have the contaminated
attribute or word was assigned to the contaminated class (e.g., no article containing the word
Computer was assigned to label “Baseball” in Figure 1c). While, in Figure 1b, 11% of records
containing the attributes “single” and “male” were predicted to default on credit card payments, when
no contaminated records were present in the training set. The contamination accuracy increases
when the training set contains a small fraction of manipulated records regardless of the type of
data or prediction task; when the training set contains 5% contaminated records the contamination
accuracy increases from 0% to 22% (ADULT), 11% to 23% (CREDIT CARD), 0% to 37% (NEWS20,
Contamination word: Computer), and 0% to 38% (NEWS20, Contamination word: BMW).
5 Defenses
Section 4 shows that it is possible to successfully contaminate a multi-party model. We investigated
several simple methods to defend against these attacks, including (i) evaluating the validation accuracy
for each class label, instead of a global value, to find the contaminated label, (ii) running independence
tests on the distribution of attributes between each party, and (iii) performing leave-one-party-out
cross validation techniques. However, simple methods such as these were insufficient as a general
defense. They are highly dependent on the type and structure of the data ((i), (ii), (iii)), are unreliable
((i), (iii)), or computationally expensive ((iii)) 9. Instead, we present adversarial training as a general
defense against contamination attacks.
9A full evaluation of these defenses is presented in Appendix B.
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Adversarial training was first proposed by Goodfellow et al. [12] as a method to learn to generate
samples from a target distribution given random noise. In Louppe et al. [26], the authors repurpose
adversarial training to train a model that pivots on a sensitive attribute - that is, the model’s predictions
are independent of the sensitive attribute. Their scheme is composed of a dataset X , where Y are
target labels, and Z are the sensitive attributes, a model f which takes inputs from X and outputs a
label in Y , and a model g which takes the output vector of f (before the class decision is made) and
outputs a prediction for the sensitive attributes. The model f is trained to minimize cross-entropy loss
of its prediction task and maximize the cross-entropy loss of g, while g is trained to minimize its own
objective function (of predicting Z). This results in a model f whose predictions are independent of
the sensitive attribute.
We propose to use an idea similar to Louppe et al. [26] to protect against contamination attacks as
follows. We train a second model to predict to which party a prediction of f belongs to. Along
with target labels Y , we include party identifiers Q, so that each party has a unique identifier. The
model g is trained to predict the party identifier, given an output of f , while f is trained to minimize
its error and maximize the error of g. (Note that f is not given Q explicitly as part of its input.) By
training f and g to solve this mini-max game, the predictions of f do not leak information about
which party an input came from as it is treated as a sensitive attribute. Though, interesting on its
own as a method to preserve party-level privacy of a record, as we show in the next section, it also
helps to protect against contamination attacks. Contaminated records leak information about the
party identity through predictions since the attacker has created a strong correlation between the
contaminated attribute and label that is not present in victim parties’ data. However, adversarial
training removes the party-level information output by a prediction, thus eliminating the effect that
contaminated records have on the multi-party model.
We show that in practice adversarial training minimizes contamination accuracy without reducing
validation accuracy, even if the contaminated attribute and label are unknown.
5.1 Theoretical results
In this section we extend the theoretical results of Louppe et al. [26] and show that if f is trained with
party identifier as a pivot attribute then we obtain (1) party-level membership privacy for the records
in the training data and (2) the classifier learns only the trends that are common to all the parties,
thereby not learning information from contaminated records. Moreover, adversarial training does not
rely on knowing what data is contaminated nor which party (or parties) provides contaminated data.
Let X be a dataset drawn from a distribution X , Q be party identifiers from Q, and Y be target
labels from Y . Let f : X → R|Y| define a predictive model over the dataset, with parameters θf ,
and argmax
1≤i≤|Y|
f(x)i maps the output of f to the target labels. Let g : R|Y| → R|Q| be a model,
parameterized by θg, where argmax
1≤i≤|Q|
g(f(x))i maps the output of g to the party identifiers. Finally,
let Z ∈ Z be a random variable that captures contaminated data provided by an attacker (either
through X or Y , or both). Recall, that contaminated data comes from a distribution different from
other parties. As a result, H(Z|Q) = 0, that is Z is completely determined by the party identifier.
Note, that it is not necessarily the case that H(Q|Z) = 0.
We train both f and g simultaneously by solving the mini-max optimization problem
argmin
θf
max
θg
Lg − Lf (2)
where both loss terms are set to the expected value of the log-likelihood of the target conditioned on
the input under the model:
Lf = Ex∼X,y∼Y [logP (y | x, θf )] (3)
Lg = Er∼fθf (X),q∼Q[logP (q | r, θg)] (4)
We now show that the solution to this mini-max game results in an optimal model that outputs
predictions independent of the target party, guaranteeing party membership privacy as a consequence.
Proposition 1. If there exists a mini-max solution to (2) such that Lf = H(Y |X) and Lg = H(Q),
then fθf is an optimal classifier and pivotal on Q where Q are the party identifiers.
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Proof. This is a restatement of Proposition 1 in Louppe et al. [26] with the nuisance parameter set to
party identifier. Hence, H(Q|fθf (X)) = H(Q).
Intuitively, an optimal fθf (X) cannot depend on contaminated data Z (i.e., the trends specific only
to a subset of parties). Otherwise, this information could be used by g to distinguish between parties,
contradicting the pivotal property of an optimal f : H(Q|fθf (X)) = H(Q). We capture this intuition
with the following theorem where we denote fθf (X) with F for brevity.
Theorem 1. If H(Z|Q) = 0 and H(Q|F ) = H(Q) then Z and F are independent.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, H(F |Q) ≤ H(F |Z). Since F and Q are independent H(F |Q) = H(F ).
Hence, H(F ) ≤ H(F |Z). By definition of conditional entropy, H(F |Z) ≤ H(F ). Hence,
H(F |Z) = H(F ) and Z and F are independent.
Lemma 1. For any random variables U , V and W , if H(U |V ) = 0 then H(W |V ) ≤ H(W |U).
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix C.
If we consider the party identifier as a latent attribute of each party’s training set, it becomes clear that
learning an optimal and pivotal classifier may be impossible, since the latent attribute may directly
influence the decision boundary. We can take the common approach of weighting one of the loss terms
in the mini-max optimization problem by a constant factor, c, and so solve argmin
θf
max
θg
cLg − Lf .
Finally, we note that an optimization algorithm chosen to solve the mini-max game may not converge
in a finite number of steps. Hence, an optimal f may not be found in practice even if one exists.
5.2 Evaluation of adversarial training
We now evaluate adversarial training as a method for training a multi-party model and as a defense
against contamination attacks. Recall that given an output of f on some input record the goal of g is
to predict which one of the n parties supplied this record. We experiment with two loss functions
when training f (g’s loss function remains the same) that we refer to as f ′ and f ′′. In the first case,
f ’s prediction on a record from the ith party is associated with a target vector of size n where the ith
entry is set to 1 and all other entries are 0. In this case, f ′ is trained to maximize the log likelihood of
f and minimize the log likelihood of g. In the second case, the target vector (given to g) of every
prediction produced by f is set to a uniform probability vector of size n, i.e., where each entry is 1/n.
In this case, f ′′ is trained to minimize the KL divergence from the uniform distribution.
The architecture of the party prediction models f ′ and f ′′ was chosen to be identical to the multi-party
model other than the number of nodes in the first and final layer. For each dataset, adversarial training
used the same number of epochs and batch sizes as defined in Section 3. Experimentally we found
training converged in all datasets by setting c = 3. If not explicitly specified, f ′ is used as a default
in the following experiments.
Contamination attacks To evaluate adversarial training as a defense, we measure the contamina-
tion and validation accuracy for each of the datasets described in Section 3 under three settings: (1) the
training set of one party contains contaminated records and the multi-party model is not adversarially
trained, (2) the training set of one party contains contaminated records and the multi-party model
is adversarially trained, (3) a local model is trained on a victim’s training set. Figure 2a shows
how adversarial training mitigates contamination attacks launched as described in Section 2 for the
ADULT dataset with 10% of the training set containing contaminated records, and CREDIT CARD and
NEWS20 datasets with 10%, and 5%, respectively. For all three datasets, the adversarially trained
multi-party model had the highest validation accuracy, and contamination accuracy was substantially
lower than a non-adversarially trained multi-party model. Figure 2b shows for the ADULT dataset,
that contamination accuracy of the adversarially trained model was close to the baseline of the local
model regardless of the fraction of contaminated records in the training set.
Contamination attacks with a multi-party attacker We repeat the evaluation of our defense in
the setting where the attacker can control more than one party and, hence, can distribute contaminated
records across the training sets of multiple parties. Here, we instantiate adversarial training with f ′′
since its task is better suited for protecting against a multi-party attacker. In Figure 3 we fix the
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Figure 2: The effect of adversarial training on contamination attacks.
Table 2: Adversarial training on clean (i.e., non-poisoned) records from different distributions.
Model Validation Accuracy Party Identifier Accuracy
Multi-Party Model f1 (No Adversarial Training) 0.715 0.642
Multi-Party Model f2 (Adversarial Training) 0.709 0.193
percentage of the contaminated records for ADULT dataset to 5% (left) and 10% (right) and show
efficacy of the defense as a function of the number of parties controlled by an attacker. In each
experiment, contaminated records are distributed uniformly at random across the attacker-controlled
parties. Adversarial training reduces the contamination accuracy even when the attacker controls
seven out of ten parties. (See Appendix D for multi-party attacker experiments on NEWS20 dataset.)
Data from different distributions So far, we have assumed each party’s training set is drawn
from similar distributions. Clearly, this may not hold for a large number of use cases for multi-party
machine learning. For adversarial training to be an efficient training method in multi-party machine
learning, it must not decrease the validation accuracy when data comes from dissimilar distributions.
To approximate this setting, we partition the ADULT dataset by occupation, creating nine datasets
of roughly equal size - where we associate a party with a dataset. We train two models, f1 and f2,
where f2 has been optimized with the adversarial training defense and f1 without. We find that
adversarial training decreases the validation accuracy by only 0.6%, as shown in the fist column
of Table 2.
Membership inference attacks In multi-party machine learning, given a training record, predicting
which party it belongs to is a form of a membership inference attack and has real privacy concerns
(see [17, 25, 40]).
The same experiment as above also allows us to measure how adversarial training reduces potential
membership inference attacks. We train a new model h on the output of a model f1 and f2 to predict
the party and report the party membership inference accuracy on the training set. Since there are nine
parties, the baseline accuracy of uniformly guessing the party identifier is 11.1%. As shown in the
second column of Table 2, h trained on f2 is only able to achieve 19.3% party-level accuracy while,
h trained on f1 achieves 64.2% accuracy. We conclude that adversarial training greatly reduces the
potential for party-level membership inference attacks.
6 Conclusion
This work introduced contamination attacks in the context of multi-party machine learning. An
attacker can manipulate a small set of data, that when pooled with other parties data, compromises the
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Figure 3: The effect of adversarial training on contamination attacks when an attacker controls datasets of one
to nine parties while contaminating 5% (left) and 10% (right) of the ADULT training set.
integrity of the model. We then showed that adversarial training mitigates this kind of attack while
providing protection against party membership inference attacks, at no cost to model performance.
Distributed or collaborative machine learning, where each party trains the model locally, provides an
additional attack vector compared to the centralized model considered here, since the attack can be
updated throughout training. Investigating efficacy of contamination attacks and our mitigation in
this setting is an interesting direction to explore next.
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A Additional ADULT dataset experiments
Figure 4 shows results for a contamination attack, and the corresponding adversarial training defense,
when the contamination label is chosen to be “high education level”, and fixed the contamination
attribute as described in Section 3. Similar to Figure 2b, adversarial training mitigates the contamina-
tion attack, reducing contamination accuracy to a baseline local model level while retaining superior
validation accuracy over both a local and contaminated multi-party model. The adversarially trained
multi-party model learns the connection with similar levels of accuracy to experiments with the “low
education level” label and so the contamination attack is not dependent on the choice of class label.
B Alternative mitigation strategies
Here, we outline several methods to defend against contamination attacks and their drawbacks.
Depending on the number of contaminated records used in the contamination attack, detection may
be relatively straightforward. For example, if an attacker inserts a large number of contaminated
records into the training set, the validation precision on the contaminated label may be significantly
worse than on other labels. Figure 5 shows this effect for the ADULT dataset, with the number
of contaminated records set to 10% of the training set. However, we observed that for smaller
numbers of contaminated records, the signal provided by the per label validation precision diminishes.
Furthermore, this detection method does not provide information about the contaminated attribute,
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Figure 4: Contamination and validation accuracy for the ADULT dataset as the number of contaminated records
increases, for a contamination label of “high education level”.
and we observed for prediction tasks with a larger number of classes, such as the NEWS20 dataset,
the per label validation precision is not a reliable detection method, as there was a high variance of
precision per label.
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Figure 5: Validation precision for each class label for
the ADULT dataset.
If one knows the attribute likely to be contami-
nated, or if there are a small number of attributes
in the dataset, independence tests could detect if
a party’s dataset contains contaminated records.
Given n > 1 parties and an attribute, each pos-
sible pair of parties can test the hypothesis “the
distribution of an attribute between the two par-
ties is independent of one another”. This can be
measured by a simple chi-square independence
test. For the ADULT dataset, we performed
an independence test on all possible pairs for
the two cases: (1) when one of the parties was
the attacker party and, (2) when both were vic-
tim parties. We found that when the attacker
only modifies 1% of their data, the p-values are
similar, both cases report p-values in 0.30-0.40
range and so reject the null hypothesis of inde-
pendence. However, if the attacker training set
contains more than 5% contaminated records, the p-value in much lower than 0.05, and so the null
hypothesis is accepted for case (1). If all data is expected to come from a similar distribution this
could indicate the presence of contaminated records. However, the assumption of similar training
data is unlikely to hold for a large number of use-cases. Moreover, this test is not applicable for text
classification due to the sparsity of the feature set.
Finally, one may consider leave-one-party-out cross validation techniques to measure the utility of
including a party’s training data. Let there be n > 1 parties with one attacker party. To discover if a
party is adversarial, a model is trained on n− 1 parties data, and evaluated on the training set of the
left out party. If the left out party contains contaminated records, this should be discovered, since
the model will report low accuracy on the left out party’s data, having been trained on only clean
records. Experimentally we found that if the amount of contaminated records is small, in the order
of 1-8% of the size of the training set, the difference between accuracy on an attacker and victim
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training set is negligible. This method also requires training a new model for each party, which may
be prohibitively expensive for a large dataset or larger numbers of parties.
C Lemma 1 proof
Lemma 1. For any random variables U , V and W , if H(U |V ) = 0 then H(W |V ) ≤ H(W |U).
Proof. Using the definition of conditional entropy:
H(W |V ) = H(V |W ) +H(W )−H(V )
H(W |U) = H(U |W ) +H(W )−H(U).
Combining the two we obtain H(W |V ) − H(W |U) = H(V |W ) − H(U |W ) + H(U) − H(V ).
Note that H(V |U) = H(V ) − H(U) since H(U |V ) = 0 from the assumption of the lemma.
Hence, we need to show that H(V |W ) −H(U |W ) −H(V |U) ≤ 0 or, equivalently, H(V |W ) ≤
H(U |W ) +H(V |U) to prove the statement.
Let U ′ be a random variable that is independent of U , s.t., H(V ) = H(U) + H(U ′). Hence,
H(V |U) = H(U ′) and H(V |U ′) = H(U). Then
H(V |W ) = H(U |W ) +H(U ′|W ) ≤ H(U |W ) +H(U ′) = H(U |W ) +H(V |U).
D Multi-party attacker experiments on NEWS20 dataset
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Figure 6: Contamination and validation accuracy for the NEWS20 dataset as the number of contaminated
records increases.
Due to the small size of the NEWS20 dataset, we found there was high variance between successive
experiments with random partitions of the dataset into distinct parties. To counter this high variance,
we introduce a nuisance word into the dataset that does not have predictive links with any labels
and was not already present in the dataset. We split the dataset into five parties, and one validation
dataset, and introduce the new word such that it covers 5% of each parties data (and covers 10% of
the attacker controlled data). We introduce the word into 50% of data points in the validation set so
we can accurately capture the effect of the attack. Figure 6 models this attack as we increase the
number of attacker controlled parties. Note we use the f ′′ method during training.
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